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EDWARD C. V. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE:
THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT BALKS
ON THE BASEBALL RULE
Christopher McNair*

INTRODUCTION
Baseball and litigation—arguably two of America’s greatest pastimes. Throughout baseball’s history, injuries to both players and spectators have been as common and accepted as home runs and the seventh
inning stretch. Foul balls routinely enter the stands traveling nearly 100
miles an hour.1 Some estimate that in the course of an average professional baseball game, thirty-five to forty baseballs are hit into spectator
areas.2 While it is true that where injury exists, litigation may soon follow,
baseball stadium owners/occupiers (Stadium Operators) have traditionally been granted a generous immunity from liability for spectator injuries resulting from projectiles leaving the field of play.3 In recent decades,
however, courts have retreated from this traditional stance albeit without
completely abandoning limitations on stadium operator liability.
In Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC,4 New Mexico was
given its first opportunity to rule on the issue of baseball stadium operator liability for spectator injuries. In 2003, a child was injured while seated
in the picnic area of Isotopes Park after being struck by a baseball during
batting practice.5 The child’s family filed suit against the ballpark but the
* J.D. 2012, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Occhialino for his continued insight through the development of this article.
Professor Occhialino assigned Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC as the first
case I read for law school. Were I “cold-called” that first day, I hope this article
adequately serves as a redemptive response to any questions I certainly flubbed. I
would also like to thank Andy Scholl for his patience and attentive feedback
throughout the editing process.
1. ROBERT M. GORMAN & DAVID WEEKS, DEATH AT THE BALLPARK: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF GAME RELATED FATALITIES OF PLAYERS, OTHER PERSONNEL, AND SPECTATORS IN AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL, 1862–2007, at
131 (2009).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Akins v. Glens Falls School Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1981).
4. 2009-NMCA-105, 216 P.3d 827 rev’d sub nom. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 241 P.3d 1086.
5. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 216 P.3d at 829.
539
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district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.6 Subsequently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected adoption of the limited duty rule for stadium operators of commercial baseball stadiums.7
The limited duty rule, or “baseball rule,” in its most widely articulated
formulation, prevented recovery for plaintiffs injured by projectiles leaving the field of play.8 Under the rule, if stadium operators provided protected seating in the most dangerous area of the stands and provided
sufficient seating in that area for those reasonably anticipated to attend
the game, then the stadium operators were said to have fulfilled their
duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law.9 The rule, in varying formulations,
has enjoyed widespread adoption throughout American courts for nearly
as long as baseball has been considered America’s past time.10 Indeed,
Judge Kennedy lamented in dissent, “[m]y colleagues reject nearly one
hundred years of American jurisprudence today.”11
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on the
issue of whether New Mexico recognized a limited duty for stadium operators to spectators injured by projectiles leaving the field of play.12 In Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, the case name on appeal, the New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and adopted a modified form of the baseball rule.13 The rule adopted by the court places a
duty on spectators of self-protection for inherent risks of the game, and a
duty on stadium operators not to increase those risks.14 Unclear from the
court’s opinion, however, is what risks are rightfully considered “inherent” and whether the rationale used by the court opens the door to further modifications to duty in the context of activities bearing inherent
risks.
Part I of this article traces the history of the baseball rule, with a
special emphasis on cases highlighted by the Edward C. court. Part II.A

6. Id. ¶ 7, 216 P.3d at 830.
7. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 216 P.3d at 834–35.
8. See id. ¶ 18, 216 P.3d at 833 (stating that the baseball rule “immunizes stadium
owners from liability regardless of how the injury occurs”).
9. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 10, 241 P.3d 1086,
1089.
10. See Gil Fried & Robin Ammon, Baseball Spectators’ Assumption of Risk: Is It
‘Fair’ or “Foul”?, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 39, 40 (2002) (“It did not take long [after
the formation of professional baseball] for litigation resulting from the risks associated with baseball to arrive at the courthouse door.”).
11. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 43, 216 P.3d at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
12. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 241 P.3d 1086.
13. Id. ¶ 4, 241 P.3d at 1088.
14. Id.
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provides a brief overview of New Mexico’s approach to duty as an element of negligence. Part II.B examines instances in which New Mexico
courts have modified the general standard of ordinary care in response to
public policy considerations. Part III discusses the facts and provides a
summary of the case from district court through the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision. Part IV.A analyzes the court’s unique “symmetrical duty” formulation of the baseball rule. Lastly, Part IV.B discusses
the possible implications of the court’s holding, including expansion of
the “symmetrical duty” concept into other sports and activities bearing an
inherent risk to both spectators and participants.
I. THE EMERGENCE AND HISTORY OF
THE BASEBALL RULE
By the turn of the century, the rise of baseball as a spectator sport
led to an increase in spectator injuries. Modifications to the game in the
late 1800s, such as overhand pitching, increased the risks associated with
attending games.15 The same factors that drew the crowds, i.e., fly balls,
fast pitches, and home runs, were often the very same factors that led to
spectator injuries.16 The injuries were often serious, and it was natural
that injured fans would turn to the court system for redress.17 In response,
courts began to develop a “baseball specific jurisprudence” to address the
growing problem of these baseball spectator injuries.18
A limited duty rule, or the “baseball rule,” emerged from early cases
with an emphasis on shielding owners of baseball stadiums from liability
for injuries to spectators. The earliest formulations of the baseball rule
stated that the duty owed by stadium operators to spectators “included
that of providing seats protected by screening from wildly thrown or foul
balls, for the use of patrons who desired such protection.”19 Under this
formulation, stadium operators fulfilled their duty when they “provided

15. Id. ¶ 22, 241 P.3d at 1092; See GORMAN & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 131 (“In
the formative years of the game, there was not much reason to be concerned for fan
safety . . . the underhand style of delivering the ball that was the rule until the late
1870s meant fewer foul balls.”).
16. See GORMAN & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 140 (discussing the death of Clarence
D. Stagemyer in 1943). Stagemyer was seated in the front row behind first base when
third baseman Sharrard Robertson “unleashed a hard wild throw” that struck
Stagemyer in the head. Id. Stagemyer died early the next day from a concussion and
fractured skull. Id.
17. See Fried & Ammon, supra note 10, at 40.
18. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 23, 241 P.3d at 1092.
19. Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913).

R
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screened seats in the grand stand [sic], and gave [the] plaintiff the opportunity of occupying one of those seats.”20 Due to customary practices at
this time, this usually meant providing screened seating in the area directly behind home plate while leaving the remainder of the grandstands
unprotected.21 This practice was often encouraged by fans that desired an
unobstructed view of the game.22
From the beginning, courts grounded the baseball rule in the tort
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. An early example of a court relying on contributory negligence is Crane v. Kansas
City Baseball & Exhibition Co.,23 which affirmed a lower court judgment
in favor of defendants. The court held that the stadium operators, to fulfill their duty of reasonable care, need only provide some screened seating and the opportunity for spectators to choose one of those seats.24 The
court denied recovery to the plaintiff because when given a choice between a screened and unprotected seat, the plaintiff chose the latter.25
The court, in quoting the agreed upon statement of facts, noted that the
risks and dangers associated with the game of baseball are “matters of
common knowledge.”26 Likewise, the court emphasized “that in these
games hard balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness . . . and visitors standing in position that may be reached by such balls have voluntarily placed themselves there with knowledge of the situation, and may be
held to assume the risk.”27 Thus, in choosing an unprotected seat, the
court held that the plaintiff’s contributory negligence prevented
recovery.28
Furthermore, some early courts expanded the rule to cover situations where no screened seating was available. In Quinn v. Recreation

20. Id.
21. See GORMAN & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 131 (“These screens were erected in
1878 along the grandstand section directly behind the catcher, an area known as the
‘slaughter pens’ for all the foul ball injuries that occurred there. Similar screens were
found in most parks by the turn of the century.”).
22. Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn.
1913) (“In fact, a large part of those who attend prefer to sit where no screen obscures
their view. The defendant has a right to cater to those desires.”).
23. 153 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913).
24. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
27. Id. at 1077–78 (quoting Blakeley v. White Star Line, 118 N.W. 482 (Mich.
1908)).
28. Id. at 1078; see also Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86, 87
(Ohio 1925) (“This theory is fortified by the fact that such spectators can watch the
ball and can thus usually avoid being struck when a ball is directed toward them.”).

R
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Park Ass’n,29 the plaintiff requested a seat behind the protective netting
but was temporarily placed in an unprotected seat.30 The plaintiff was
struck by a foul ball soon after and brought suit against the ballpark.31
The court upheld the judgment in favor of the defendant.32 The court reasoned that the baseball rule does not require a ballpark “to provide
scree[n]ed seats for all who may apply for them.”33 Rather, the duty is
satisfied when screened seating is provided for “as many as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion.”34 Therefore,
even in choosing an unscreened seat over no seat at all, the plaintiff was
still held to have assumed the risk of injury by an errant baseball and the
suit was barred.35
Despite the low standard required for stadium operators, not all
early cases found in their favor. In Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n,36 the court allowed the plaintiff’s case to proceed on the issue
of whether the screen provided sufficient protection.37 The plaintiff’s position in the grandstands was disputed,38 however, the court found this contention immaterial to the determination of the case.39 Rather, the court
stated that not all patrons should be held to assume the dangers incidental to the game of baseball, nor the risks associated with sitting outside
the protective netting.40 The court noted that the plaintiff, a woman, was
attending the game as part of a promotional event allowing free admittance for women.41 Important to the court’s holding was the assumption
that women were unfamiliar with both the game and the potential for
injuries posed by an errant baseball.42 Ultimately, the court held that

29. 46 P.2d 144 (Cal. 1935).
30. Id. at 145.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id.; see also Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 240 N.W. 903,
904 (Minn. 1932) (Ballparks “exercise the required care if they provide screen for the
most dangerous part of the grand stand and for those who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats . . . .”).
35. Quinn, 46 P.2d at 147.
36. 142 N.W. 706 (Minn. 1913).
37. Id. at 708.
38. Id. at 707. The plaintiff contended that she was seated behind the screen and
that the foul ball curved around the netting and struck her. Id. Witnesses, however,
claimed she was seated beyond the protection of the net when struck by the ball. Id.
39. Id. at 708.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (“Only those who have been struck by a baseball realize its hardness, swiftness, and dangerous force. Women and others not acquainted with the game are in-
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whether the stadium operator took sufficient precautions to either warn
or protect the unaware plaintiff was for the jury to determine.43
Subsequent decades saw modifications to the baseball rule in response to more nuanced fact patterns before the courts. The game itself
was being “presented in a different manner and watched by a different
demographic than in the era in which the baseball rule had its genesis.”44
Additionally, secondary entertainment, such as mascots and video displays, were increasingly diverting fans attention away from on-field activity.45 When coupled with a quicker pace and stronger players,46 courts
became more willing to consider the “pragmatic difficulty [in] applying an
old rule to a sport that has changed tremendously” since the baseball
rule’s emergence.47
An important development that arose from these cases was the application of assumption of risk principles to limit the baseball rule to inherent risks of the game. This development was first articulated in Brown
v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc.48 The court stated that baseball stadium
patrons do not assume “the risk of being injured by the proprietor’s negligence but that by voluntarily entering into the sport as a spectator he
knowingly accepts the reasonable risks and hazards inherent in and incident to the game.”49 While this principle was used to deny recovery to the
plaintiff in Brown,50 subsequent cases, either explicitly or impliedly,
adopted a similar “inherent risks” centered analysis in allowing certain
cases to go before juries.

vited, and do attend. It would not be either a safe or reasonable rule to hold
that . . . no duty rests upon the management to protect from the dangers incident
thereto, other than by a proper screening of part of the seats.”).
43. Id.
44. Dave Horton, Rethinking Assumption of Risk and Sports Spectators, 51
UCLA L. REV. 339, 344 (2003).
45. See Fried & Ammon, supra note 10, at 54–58 (discussing “distraction theory”
in baseball rule jurisprudence and providing list of modern common distractions in
baseball parks, including video displays, on-field contests, and non-traditional spectator areas such as hot tubs and carrousels).
46. Horton, supra note 44, at 343.
47. Id. at 365–66.
48. 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 23 (stating that it is common knowledge of the “potential dangers inherent in a baseball in play[,] with the fact that a flying baseball is capable of inflicting
painful, sometimes serious and even fatal, injury; and that when in play it may fly in
any direction and strike any bystander not on alert to evade it. The knowledge of
those characteristics of a baseball must be imputed to every reasonable person having
the admitted experience and opportunities of plaintiff to know these things.”).

R
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An early example of a court allowing a case to proceed on the basis
that the injury was not a result of an “inherent risk” of the game was
Maytnier v. Rush.51 The plaintiff in Maytnier requested a ticket outside
the protected seating area near the Chicago Cubs dugout.52 While watching the game, the plaintiff was struck on the left side of his face by an
errant pitch thrown from the bullpen.53 The court acknowledged the
traditional formulation of the baseball rule54 but distinguished the facts
presented in this case from earlier cases holding in favor of defendants.
The court stated, “[t]hese cases all dealt with injuries to a spectator from
a batted or thrown ball that was the ball actually in play . . . or . . . when
no game was, in fact, in progress.”55 Ultimately, the court recognized that
spectators should only be held to assume the risk of dangers of which
they are likely to be aware.56 Therefore, the court declined to state as a
matter of law that spectators assume the risk of every ball “permitted
upon the field” regardless of its proximity to the grandstands or the relative necessity of a ball not in play.57 Implicit in the court’s holding is the
proposition that spectators should only be held to assume the risks associated with on-field or in-game activity. Extending the rule beyond that
scope would require spectators to be aware of all potential risks in the
park, presumably at the expense of the spectator experience, namely
watching the game.
Similarly, in Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp.,58 the issue
before the court was whether the plaintiff assumed an “inherent risk” of
the game when struck during batting practice and while inside an interior
walkway of the stadium.59 The court stated that the rationale behind the
baseball rule “naturally limits its application to those injuries incurred as
a result of risks any baseball spectator must and will be held to anticipate.”60 The risks must be characterized as “common, frequent, and expected” aspects of the game.61 Since the interior walkway was neither an
“inherent feature” of baseball nor commonly associated with the way in

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

225 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 87.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.
Id.
394 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978).
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id.
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which the game is viewed, the court held that the district court improperly applied the baseball rule to bar the plaintiff’s suit.62
These cases are indicative of the shift in baseball rule jurisprudence
during the mid-twentieth century. Similar to the changes in the game
which led to the emergence of the rule, changes in the way the game was
viewed during this time led to the “inherent risk” modification in the
rule’s application. As noted by the court in Maisonave v. Newark Bears
Professional Baseball Club, Inc.,63 the traditional baseball rule could no
longer account for “all of the activities that are part of today’s game,
nor . . . that players can hit baseballs harder and farther.”64 Similarly, it
was not just the game of baseball that was changing during this time.
Many states began abandoning the doctrine of contributory negligence,
often seen as pro-defendant and “weighed against injured plaintiffs seeking redress,” in favor of comparative negligence.65 As more jurisdictions
began making the transition to comparative negligence, the question remained whether the baseball rule, with its grounding in assumption of
risk, survived the transition. Like the following cases, this issue marked a
point of distinction in the approaches taken by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court in Edward C. v. City of
Albuquerque.66
One of the first cases to consider the baseball rule after a transition
from contributory negligence to comparative negligence was Akins v.
Glens Falls City School District.67 Not only did the court apply the baseball rule, but it adopted the rule in its most limited formulation. In Akins,
the plaintiff was attending a high school baseball game and was struck by
a foul ball while standing behind a fence along the third-base line.68 The
court held that “in the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor of a ball
park need only provide screening for the area of the field behind home
plate where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest.”69 Since

62. Id. at 551–52.
63. 881 A.2d 700 (N.J. 2005), superseded by statute New Jersey Baseball Safety
Act of 2006, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 to 48 (West 2005), as recognized in Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 944 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. 2008).
64. Id. at 708.
65. John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1026–1027 (2005).
66. 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 19–20, 241 P.3d 1086, 1091. The New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted comparative negligence in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981), superseded by statute, NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987), as stated in Reichert v.
Atler, 875 P.2d 384 (1992).
67. 424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981).
68. Id. at 532.
69. Id. at 533.
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the baseball field had a backstop, the court held as a matter of law that
the school district “fulfilled its duty of reasonable care.”70 In so holding,
the court declined to address the trial court’s jury instruction on assumption of risk because of the framing of the duty.71 In other words, in satisfying their duty of reasonable care, there was no case of negligence to go
before the jury, nor an issue of whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk
of being struck by a baseball.
The problem with Akins, however, is that whether a defendant has
exercised ordinary care is usually an issue for the jury.72 Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd.73 is instructive on this point. The Coronel court rejected the defendant’s argument that a stadium operator’s duty to
spectators is discharged by simply screening the area behind home plate.74
The Coronel court concluded that the issue of whether the White Sox had
provided adequate screening was one of whether the defendants had exercised reasonable care.75 Rather than modifying the standard of reasonable care for stadium operators like in Akins, the Coronel court held that
whether the protective screening was sufficient was an issue of breach,
and therefore, a question of fact for the jury.76 Even the Akins court conceded that what constitutes reasonable care is generally for the jury to
determine.77 However, Akins further stated that like any negligence action, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has adequately
proven the requisite elements.78 Absent evidence that the backstop itself
was inadequate, the plaintiff in Akins failed to prove the essential elements of the action and, as a matter of law, was precluded from seeking
recovery.79

70. Id. at 535.
71. Id.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 8 cmt. b. (2010) (“Accordingly, so long as reasonable minds can differ in evaluating whether the actor’s conduct lacks reasonable care, the responsibility
for making this evaluation rests with the jury.”).
73. 595 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), superseded by statute, 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 38/1 (1992), as recognized in Jasper v. Chi. Nat’l League Baseball Club, 722
N.E.2d 731 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Illinois abolished the defense of contributory negligence and adopted comparative fault in Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981),
superseded by statute, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (1986), as recognized in Burke v.
12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ill. 1992).
74. Coronel, 595 N.E.2d at 48.
75. Id. at 47.
76. Id.
77. Akins v. Glens Falls School Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1981).
78. Id.
79. Akins, 424 N.E.2d at 535.
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The baseball rule has also survived the transition to comparative
fault in jurisdictions that have adopted the distinction between primary
and secondary assumption of risk. In Knight v. Jewett,80 the California
Supreme Court distinguished between the use of assumption of risk as a
“variant of contributory negligence” and its use as a “legal conclusion
that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff
from a particular risk . . . .”81 The former is termed “secondary assumption of risk” while the later is generally referred to as “primary assumption of risk.”82 The Knight court stated that primary assumption of risk is
consistent with the comparative fault system because without a legal duty
there is no weighing of fault.83 This principle was instrumental in the California Court of Appeals decision in Lowe v. California League of Professional Baseball,84 in which the court held that baseball stadium operators
had a duty “not to increase the inherent risks to which spectators at professional baseball games are regularly exposed and which they assume.”85
In Lowe, the plaintiff was struck by a foul ball after his attention was
diverted from the game by the team’s mascot bumping the plaintiff’s
head.86 The court stated that the key inquiry was whether the injury causing risk was an “inevitable or unavoidable” feature of actually playing
baseball.87 Since a mascot’s “antics” were not integral to the game, summary judgment was reversed and the plaintiff’s suit was allowed to
proceed.88
While the tort doctrines used by courts to justify the baseball rule
have changed with time and the evolution of both the game and how it is
viewed, the policy rationales cited by courts have stayed the same. As to
spectators, courts have reasoned that the majority of fans desire an unobstructed view of the game.89 Furthermore, many fans attend baseball
games hoping to catch foul balls and other souvenirs from the field of

80. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
81. Id. at 701, 703.
82. Id. at 703.
83. Id. at 704 (“[W]hen the defendant has not breached a legal duty of care to the
plaintiff, the defendant has not committed any conduct which would warrant the imposition of any liability whatsoever, and thus there is no occasion at all for invoking
comparative fault principles.”).
84. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
85. Id. at 106 (internal emphasis omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 111.
88. Id.
89. See Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn.
1913) (“[A] large part of those who attend [baseball games] prefer to sit where no
screen obscures the view.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-2\NMX205.txt

Fall 2011]

unknown

Seq: 11

24-JAN-12

EDWARD C. V. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE

10:46

549

play.90 Courts have routinely held that baseball stadium operators have a
legitimate business interest in catering to the majority of fans’ desires.91
Similarly, the possibility that any cause of action involving a fan injured
by a projectile leaving the field could lead to a jury trial has led some
courts to speculate that it would lead to stadium operators taking unreasonable precautions, such as screening the whole park.92 This in turn
would lead to the “demise or substantial alteration of the game of baseball as a spectator sport.”93 While this may be an instance of judicial fear
mongering, it is clear that these basic policy rationales offered for the
baseball rule have kept the rule a viable staple of American jurisprudence
for the past one hundred years.
II. FORMULATION AND MODIFICATION OF DUTY
IN NEW MEXICO LAW
A major issue in baseball rule jurisprudence is whether the rule defines the scope of a stadium operator’s duty to spectators and is thus determined as a matter of law or, rather, if the issue is one of breach of a
duty of ordinary care to be determined by the jury. Part II.A provides a
general overview of the New Mexico approach to duty. Part II.B dis-

90. See Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Mich. Ct. App.
2001) (“[P]atrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and
are even hoping that they will come in contact with some projectile from the
field . . . .”); see also Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900, 905
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he chance to apprehend a misdirected ball is as much a part
of the game as the seventh inning stretch or peanuts and Cracker Jack[s].”). But see
“A Good Kid” Gets in the Way, ESPN (Oct. 16, 2003), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/
playoffs2003/news/story?id=1638663. Steve Bartman, a lifelong Cubs fan, blocked a
Cubs outfielder from catching a foul ball in a National League Championship Series
game in which the Cubs were playing for the pennant. Id. The Cubs led the game 3-0
in 8th inning, however, the inning was extended by the incident and the Florida Marlins rallied to win the game 8-3. Id. The Marlins subsequently won game seven and
eventually the World Series. Id. Bartman was viewed as a scapegoat by frustrated
Cubs fans. Id. He was escorted out of the stadium by security personnel and received
death threats from many fans. Id.
91. See Wells, 142 N.W. at 708; see also Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 441
N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981).
92. See Bellezzo v. State, 851 P.2d 847, 853 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (adopting baseball rule, in part, to “prevent a jury from requiring [defendants] to take precautions
that are clearly unreasonable” and declining “to make proprietors of baseball stadiums insurers against the ordinary risk a spectator seated in an unscreened area of the
baseball stadium may be struck by a ball”).
93. Benejam, 635 N.W.2d at 223.
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cusses instances in which New Mexico has modified the duty of ordinary
care where public policy concerns justify the modification.
A. New Mexico’s Approach to the Determination of a Legal Duty
While it has been stated that there is “nothing sacred” about duty,94
the myriad of abstract concepts and legal principles have perplexed
courts attempting to apply a consistent and approachable framework.
Courts may include any combination of “factual foreseeability, legal policy, [and] social policy” but often these terms are ambiguous at best and
inconsistently applied at worst.95 When viewed generally, duty is said to
“define[ ] the legal obligations of one party toward another and limits the
reach of potential liability.”96 In practice, however, it may simply become
a placeholder, an indefinite word behind which the court will couch its
conclusions.97
In New Mexico, whether a duty exists is a matter of law and determined by the court.98 This determination is one of policy and foreseeability.99 Policy is determined by “reference to legal precedent, statutes, and
other principles comprising the law.”100 Within the policy prong of duty,
statutory duties trump caselaw, just as established caselaw trumps considerations of general public policy.101 The theory behind this hierarchical
structure being that it is for the legislature to formulate public policy, not
the courts unless required by the absence of legislative direction.102
The foreseeability factor of duty in New Mexico is in a state of flux.
Traditionally, New Mexico courts have required the plaintiff to have been
foreseeably within the zone of risk created by the defendant’s conduct.103
The often cited rule, however, that “[i]f it is found that a plaintiff, and

94. Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 73 P.3d 181, 186. (quoting
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825).
95. Nancy Desiderio, Tort Law—Evolution of Duty in New Mexico: Torres v.
State, 26 N.M. L. REV. 585, 588 (1996). See id. (discussing the inconsistent approach
taken by the New Mexico Supreme Court in determining duty).
96. Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62 n.1, 792 P.2d 36, 39 (1990).
97. See Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 73 P.3d at 186 (stating duty “is nothing
more than a word, and a very indefinite one, with which [the court] state[s] [its] conclusion” (quoting Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 73 P.3d at 825)).
98. Schear v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 101 N.M. 671, 672, 687 P.2d 728, 729 (1984).
99. Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995); see also Calkins,
110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38 (stating duty “must be decided as a matter of law by the
judge, using established legal policy”).
100. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
101. See Desiderio, supra note 95, at 589–99.
102. Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389.
103. Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 8–9, 73 P.3d 181, 186–87.
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injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant”104 has gradually given way to a phrasing of foreseeability in the negative. In other words, the determination can be
articulated as whether the plaintiff could be unforeseeable to any reasonable mind as a matter of law.105 Thus, while New Mexico courts have long
recognized the dual factors of foreseeabilty and policy in determining
duty,106 the ultimate issue is whether the defendant’s obligation to the
plaintiff is one the court will give “recognition and effect.”107
In determining the obligations of a defendant to a particular plaintiff, it is important to first distinguish between affirmative and defensive
duties. An “affirmative duty” is one defined by a “specific statutory or
common-law standard.”108 It places upon the actor the duty to conform to
the standard of care articulated by the statute or common law rule creating the affirmative duty. In other words, it mandates a “legally obligatory
course of conduct toward a certain type of individual,” which is often
based on an established legally recognized relationship.109 It is considered
“affirmative” because it is asserted by the injured party as the basis for
his/her claim.110 In establishing an affirmative duty, it must be shown that
the plaintiff “be a person foreseeably within the scope of [a] defendant’s
duty to use reasonable care.”111 A “defensive duty,” on the other hand, is
that found in the common law negligence standard.112 It is a duty of reasonable care owed by an individual to “society as a whole.”113 It too considers elements of foreseeability, however, unlike an affirmative duty, the
focus here is on the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct, if below
the required standard of care, would injure the plaintiff.114 It is termed
defensive because it is used by a defendant who has acted below the re104. Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983).
105. See Torres, 119 N.M. at 613, 894 P.2d at 390 (“Foreseeability is a question of
law when a court, in reviewing whether a duty exists, can determine that the victim
was unforeseeable to any reasonable mind.”); see also Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 25,
73 P.3d at 192 (stating “we cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s injuries were so unforeseeable that we must hold that Defendant did not owe Plaintiffs a duty as a matter of
law”); Desiderio, supra note 95, at 596 (“The preliminary foreseeability question after
Torres is not ‘Is the plaintiff, and injury to the plaintiff, foreseeable?’ but is ‘Is the
plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, not unforeseeable?’ . . . .”).
106. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 26, 73 P.3d at 192.
107. Id. ¶ 9, 73 P.3d at 187.
108. Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62 n.1, 792 P.2d 36, 39 (1990).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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quired standard of care to “limit the potential scope of . . . liability” by
claiming that the plaintiff could not have foreseeably been harmed by his/
her conduct.115
New Mexico recognizes an affirmative duty between landowners
and visitors. In Ford v. Board of County Commissioners,116 New Mexico
abolished the previous distinctions between business visitors and public
invitees and held that standard negligence principles governed the duties
of landowners to visitors.117 As such, “[a] landowner or occupier of [a]
premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a
reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the
likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.”118 Thus, stated concisely, the common law affirmative duty of landowners to visitors is “the duty to use ordinary care
to keep the premises safe for use by the visitor,”119 with ordinary care
being that “which a reasonably prudent person would use in the conduct
of the person’s own affairs.”120
B. New Mexico Modifications to the Duty to Exercise Ordinary Care
In some instances the duty of ordinary care has been modified in
response to particular public policy interests. In fact, when New Mexico
courts adopted a generalized landowner to visitor duty of care in Ford,
the court declined to extend the rule to trespassers.121 The policy being
that extending the same duty to trespassers as visitors would place “an
unfair burden on a landowner who has no reason to expect a trespasser’s
presence.”122 Similarly, the “firefighter’s rule,” adopted in Moreno v.
Marrs,123 was a modification of the landowner duty to firefighters responding to a call on the landowner’s property.124 Under the rule, a
firefighter could only recover for injuries incurred on the job when the
landowner or occupier failed to warn the firefighter of a known hidden
danger on the property or negligently or intentionally misrepresented the
nature of the hazard being confronted by the firefighter.125 The policy rationales for the rule began with recognition of the duty firefighters have
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
118 N.M. 134, 879 P.2d 766 (1994).
Id. at 139, 879 P.2d at 771.
Id.
UJI 13-1309 NMRA.
UJI 13-1603 NMRA.
Ford, 118 N.M. at 139, 879 P.2d at 771.
Id. at 138, 879 P.2d at 770.
102 N.M. 373, 695 P.2d 1322 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 376–77, 695 P.2d at 1325–26.
Id. at 378, 695 P.2d at 1327.
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to respond to hazardous situations and also included encouraging the
public to call for assistance when needed.126 Though Baldonado v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co.127 later modified the firefighter’s rule by abandoning its
basis in landowner/occupier duties of care,128 the rule highlights the role
public policy may play in determining the duty owed by a class of defendants to certain potential plaintiffs.
New Mexico also recognizes modified duties in certain activities that
are accompanied by some level of inherent risk. In Kabella v. Bouschelle,129 the court of appeals held that “a cause of action for personal
injuries between participants incurred during athletic competition must
be predicated upon recklessness or intentional conduct . . . .”130 In so
holding, the court stated that “[v]igorous and active participation in
sporting events should not be chilled by the threat of litigation.”131 Similarly, the New Mexico Legislature has passed a number of statutes either
defining the duty of care owed by particular individuals to members of
the public, or in some cases outright denying liability. For instance, due to
the public policy of encouraging both the personal and economic benefits
of equine activities and recognition of its inherent risks, the Equine Liability Act132 bars recovery for injuries incurred during equine-related activities. Similarly, the Ski Safety Act133 limits the duty of ski area
operators and places a duty upon patrons to conduct themselves in a
manner consistent with the inherent risks of skiing.134 Like the Equine
Liability Act, the policy behind the statute is one of shielding a class of
potential defendants from liability from risks inherent in a particular activity.135 In so doing, it encourages either an economic or socially beneficial activity for the citizens of the state by limiting liability to those who
facilitate its continued operation.136
126. Baldonado v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 2008-NMSC-005, ¶ 11, 176 P.3d 277,
280.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 18, 176 P.3d at 281.
129. 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
130. Id. at 465, 672 P.2d 294.
131. Id.
132. NMSA 1978, §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (1993).
133. NMSA 1978, §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1969).
134. NMSA 1978, § 24-15-10(A).
135. See NMSA 1978, § 24-15-2(B) (“It is the purpose of the Ski Safety Act to
define those . . . risks which the skier . . . expressly assumes and for which there can
be no recovery.”).
136. But see Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2002-NMCA-060, ¶ 20, 48 P.3d 70,
76–77 (“The fact that a recreational activity involves some inherent risk of physical
injury does not justify relieving the operators of recreational facilities of a duty of care
to protect patrons against unreasonable and unnecessary risks.”).
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The principle emerges that overriding public policy interests must be
at stake before New Mexico courts will engage in duty modification.137
While it may be true that New Mexico law is moving “away from judicially declared immunity or protectionism,”138 it is equally clear that
courts may still decline to impose on a defendant a duty to a specific class
of persons, even if they are foreseeable plaintiffs, for public policy reasons.139 What constitutes sufficient public policy to warrant the modification of a duty is unclear. However, as noted above, where a plaintiff
approaches a socially or economically beneficial activity with some notice
of its inherent risks, New Mexico courts and the New Mexico Legislature
show some willingness to extend protection to the operators or
facilitators of the activity.
III. EDWARD C. V. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE: NEW MEXICO’S
ADOPTION OF A LIMITED DUTY RULE FOR
COMMERCIAL BASEBALL STADIUM OPERATORS
On July 21, 2003, four-year-old Emilio Crespin attended an Albuquerque Isotopes minor league baseball game with his family.140 The
Crespin family arrived at Isotopes Stadium early to attend a banquet taking place at picnic tables located beyond the left field fence.141 The picnic
tables were arranged so that those seated at the tables were not directly
facing the baseball field.142 The family alleged that during the banquet,
the visiting team, the New Orleans Zephyrs, began batting practice without Isotopes employees warning those in attendance.143 Subsequently,
Zephyr’s player Dave Mantranga hit a ball that entered the picnic area
striking Emilio in the head, fracturing his skull.144
Isotopes Stadium is owned by the City of Albuquerque and leased
to the Isotopes.145 The family brought suit against the City of Albuquer-

137. See Baldonado v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 2008-NMCA-010, ¶ 14, 176 P.3d
286, 292 (“A defendant who seeks shelter from generally applicable rules of tort liability must demonstrate that the exception is justified by overwhelming public policy
considerations.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
138. Yount v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-004, ¶ 4, 915 P.2d 341, 342.
139. Baldonado, 2008-NMCA-010, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d at 290, 292.
140. Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 2, 216 P.3d
827, 829 rev’d sub nom. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 241 P.3d
1086.
141. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 6, 241 P.3d 1086, 1088.
142. Id. ¶ 6, 241 P.3d at 1088–89.
143. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 2, 216 P.3d at 829.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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que (City), the Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC d/b/a the Albuquerque
Isotopes (Isotopes), the Houston McClane Co. d/b/a the Houston Astros
(Astros),146 and Dave Matranga.147 The plaintiffs alleged that the City and
the Isotopes owed a duty of ordinary care to keep the stadium safe for
the patrons.148 Plaintiffs further alleged that the City and the Isotopes
breached that duty by failing to protect the families in the picnic area by
not providing sufficient protective netting or warning them batting practice had begun.149
A. District Court
The Defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming that
the City and the Isotopes fulfilled their duty as a matter of law to the
plaintiffs by providing screened seating behind home plate.150 The City
and the Isotopes relied on baseball rule caselaw to persuade the court
that they owed a limited duty to the Crespin family.151 The Astros provided similar caselaw but also included the official rules of baseball to
establish that the game “anticipate[s] and expect[s]” players to hit balls
into spectator areas.152 Noting the widespread adoption of the baseball
rule in other jurisdictions, the district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.153
B. New Mexico Court of Appeals: Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball
Club
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that it was error for the district
court to recognize the baseball rule in granting summary judgment since
no New Mexico appellate court had expressly adopted the rule.154 The
court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs and held that New Mexico does
not recognize the baseball rule.155 The court of appeals held instead that
the duty stadium operators owe to spectators is that of “ordinary care for

146. In 2003, the Zephyrs were the Houston Astros farm team. See Derby Gisclair,
History of New Orleans Baseball, available at http://www.sabrneworleans.com/history.
html (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
147. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 1, 241 P.3d at 1088.
148. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 2, 216 P.3d at 830.
149. Id. ¶ 6, 216 P.3d at 830.
150. Id. ¶ 3, 216 P.3d at 830.
151. Id.
152. Id. ¶ 30, 216 P.3d at 836.
153. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 13, 241 P.3d 1086,
1189–90.
154. See id. at ¶ 11, 241 P.3d at 1089 (“Plaintiffs . . . contend that the baseball rule
is inconsistent with New Mexico’s system of pure comparative fault . . . .”).
155. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 23, 216 P.3d at 834.
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the safety of the person and property of others.”156 The court reversed
summary judgment for the defendants since there were issues of material
fact as to whether the duty of ordinary care was breached by the City and
the Isotopes.157 The court, however, upheld summary judgment for the
Astros and Dave Matranga on the grounds that they “made a prima facie
case that their actions satisfied their duty to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances.”158
In declining to adopt the baseball rule, the court began by examining New Mexico tort law in light of the Crespin facts. The court conceded
that in McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters,159 the New Mexico Supreme
Court expressed approval, albeit in dictum, of the immunity granted by
the baseball rule.160 The court noted, however, that McFatridge was decided prior to New Mexico’s adoption of comparative negligence in Scott
v. Rizzo.161 The court cited Rizzo for the proposition that, upon adoption
of comparative negligence, the doctrine of “assumption of risk” became
“subject to the comparative negligence rule.”162 Therefore, a baseball
“spectator’s assumption of the risks inherent in the game may inform the
fact finder’s assessment of the parties relative fault” but not “preclude the
spectator from recovering if he or she is injured as a result of one of those
risks.”163
The court made two important characterizations of the baseball rule
that were determinative of its outcome. First, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the baseball rule is a limit on a defendant’s

156. Id. ¶ 12, 216 P.3d at 831 (quoting Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 648,
808 P.2d 614, 618 (1991)).
157. Id. ¶¶ 25–29, 216 P.3d at 835–36.
158. Id. ¶¶ 32–33, 216 P.3d at 836 (reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to show that
Matranga intentionally tried to hit the child or another attendee). The court reasoned
that Matranga did what his employers expected him to do: “hit a home run over the
fence during batting practice.” Id.
159. 69 N.M. 271, 365 P.2d 918 (1961). The McFatridge court upheld judgment in
favor of a plaintiff struck by a basketball thrown by a Harlem Globetrotter by, in part,
distinguishing the nature of a basketball game from baseball. Id. at 277, 365 P.2d at
922. The court stated “[t]hat there is danger from being injured by being struck by
balls hit foul or otherwise striking spectators in certain locations at baseball games
which would be known to fans of the game is clear and from this fact arises the custom to protect areas of greatest danger.” Id.
160. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d at 831.
161. Id. ¶ 11, 216 P.3d at 831; Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981),
superseded by statute, NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987), as stated in Reichert v. Atler,
117 N.M. 628, 875 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1992).
162. Crespin, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d at 831 (quoting Rizzo, 96 N.M. at
687, 634 P.2d at 1239).
163. Id. ¶ 11, 216 P.3d at 831.
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duty.164 In other words, the court found that the baseball rule relates to
the breach of a duty and not the initial scope used to determine whether a
breach occurred. Second, since the baseball rule relates to breach of duty,
the court characterized it as a rule of immunity because it “immunizes
stadium owners from liability regardless of how the injury occurs.”165 Citing New Mexico’s move “away from judicially declared immunity or protectionism,”166 the court concluded that “there is no compelling reason to
immunize the owners/occupiers of baseball stadiums.”167
C. New Mexico Supreme Court: Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether New Mexico “should recognize a limited duty for owners/
occupiers of commercial baseball stadiums.”168 The court overturned the
court of appeals and recognized a unique form of the baseball rule applicable only to commercial baseball stadiums.169 The court held that the
duty of a stadium operators is “symmetrical” to that of the spectator.170
“The spectator must exercise ordinary care to protect himself or herself
from the inherent risk of being hit by a projectile that leaves the field of
play and the owner/occupant must exercise ordinary care not to increase
that inherent risk.”171 The court, however, upheld the denial of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.172 The court stated that the defendants’ affidavits established compliance with a form of the baseball
rule that limited a defendant’s duty to screening the most dangerous part
of the stands, i.e., the area behind home plate.173 The defendants, however, did not establish that they had exercised ordinary care to not increase the inherent risks of the game to the plaintiffs.174 Therefore, issues
of material fact existed as to whether the defendants had complied with
the rule adopted by the court.175
The court began its analysis by stating that the existence and scope
of a duty is a legal question and determined by the “sport or activity in
164. Id. ¶ 13, 216 P.3d at 831.
165. Id. ¶ 18, 216 P.3d at 833.
166. Id. ¶ 24, 216 P.3d at 834 (emphasis omitted) (citing Yount v. Johnson, 1996NMCA-046, ¶ 4, 915 P.2d 341, 343).
167. Id. ¶ 23, 216 P.3d 834.
168. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 3, 241 P.3d 1086, 1088.
169. Id. ¶ 4, 241 P.3d at 1088.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. ¶5, 241 P.3d at 1088.
173. See id. ¶43, 241 P.3d at 1098.
174. Id. ¶ 5, 241 P.3d at 1088.
175. Id.
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question, the parties’ general relationship to the activity, and public policy considerations.”176 Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance
of policy in a court’s determination of whether a duty is owed and the
scope of that duty.177 The court took issue with the court of appeals conclusion that, because Emilio Crespin was a foreseeable plaintiff, the defendants owed him a duty.178 The court reiterated that foreseeability is
“but one factor . . . and not the principle question.”179 Rather than first
look to foreseeability, the court saw the issue as whether there existed an
affirmative or defensive duty.180 The court concluded that the case dealt
with an affirmative duty since New Mexico common law traditionally recognized a relationship between landowners and visitors that gives rise to
a legal duty.181
While recognizing that ordinary care is the general duty applied in
landowner/occupier cases, the court noted that modification of a duty is
appropriate in some circumstances.182 The court stated that modification
may be appropriate where “‘reasonable minds could differ about the application of the negligence standard to a particular category of recurring
facts.’”183 Further, such modification “‘has the benefit of providing
clearer rules of behavior for actors who may be subject to tort liability
and who structure their behavior in response to that potential liability.’”184 The court’s main concern, however, was whether modification of
the duty of ordinary care in this context was “supported by sound policy
consistent with New Mexico’s pure comparative fault system and a general interest in promoting safety, welfare, and fairness.”185 Thus, in approaching the baseball rule, the court was primarily concerned with two
issues. First, whether jurisdictions with a similar landowner-to-visitor duty
as New Mexico had applied the baseball rule to spectator injuries;186 and
second, whether the policy rationales for modifying the stadium operator

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. ¶ 14, 241 P.3d at 1090.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 241 P.3d at 1091.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15, 241 P.3d at 1090.
Id. ¶ 16, 241 P.3d 1090.
Id. ¶ 21, 241 P.3d at 1091.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM, § 7 cmt. i (2010)).
184. Id. ¶ 21, 241 P.3d at 1092 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 7 cmt. i (2010)).
185. Id. ¶ 20, 241 P.3d at 1091.
186. Id.
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duty in these jurisdictions were consistent with New Mexico’s pure comparative fault system.187
While providing a comprehensive history of the development of the
baseball rule, the court focused on cases discussing the risks inherent in
viewing the game of baseball, as this development in the baseball rule is
associated with the shift to comparative negligence.188 Important to the
court’s discussion was Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball
Club, Inc.,189 Maytiener v. Rush,190 and Jones v. Three Rivers Management
Corp.191 All three of these cases limited the baseball rule’s application to
either risks inherent in the game or to specific areas of the ballpark dedicated solely to viewing the game.192 The New Mexico Supreme Court
found persuasive the rationale in these cases that injured spectators
should be “allowed to advance their claim when the injury is the result of
some circumstance, design, or conduct neither necessary nor inherent in
the game.”193 Implied in the court’s emphasis on these cases is the notion
that the traditional application of the baseball rule, as a complete bar to a
plaintiff’s suit, is inconsistent with the adoption of comparative fault.
Similarly, the court’s articulation of the baseball rule is substantially
drawn from a string of California cases ruling on modified duties in response to the inherent risks of an activity. The court cited Brown v. San
Francisco Ball Club, Inc.,194 as an early baseball rule case recognizing a
“relative and mutual duty on the owner/occupant and the spectator.”195
Under the Brown rationale, the inherent risks of the game place a duty of
“self-protection” upon the spectator, but the risks created by the stadium
operator’s negligence are considered “outside the relative and mutual expectations of the parties.”196 This approach to duty evolved in Knight v.
Jewett197 as a duty to “not increase the risks . . . over and above those in-

187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 27, 241 P.3d at 1094-95; see also Fried & Ammon, supra note 1010, at 43
(“Some lawyers involved in baseball negligence cases believed the subtle change toward plaintiff judgments occurred due to the shift in some states from assumption of
the risk to comparative negligence as a defense.”).
189. 881 A.2d 700 (N.J. 2005), superseded by statute, New Jersey Baseball Safety
Act of 2006, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 to 48 (West 2005), as recognized in Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 944 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. 2008).
190. 225 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
191. 394 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978).
192. See supra Part I (discussing Maisonave, Maytiener, and Jones).
193. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 27, 241 P.3d at 1094.
194. 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
195. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 36, 241 P.3d at 1096.
196. Id. ¶ 3, 241 P.3d at 1096–97 (citing Brown, 222 P.2d at 20).
197. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).

R
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herent in the sport.”198 While Knight was not a baseball rule case, its holding was adopted by the Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball199
court to modify California’s baseball stadium operator’s duty to spectators.200 Thus, this string of cases presented the New Mexico Supreme
Court with a formulation of the baseball rule in a jurisdiction with similar
comparative fault principles as New Mexico. As noted by the New Mexico Supreme Court, this articulation comported with New Mexico precedent as, like Knight v. Jewett,201 New Mexico also had modified a duty
where “physical injury is inherent to the activity.”202
Having cited support for the modified baseball rule in jurisdictions
employing similar comparative fault principles as New Mexico, the court
adopted a similarly modified version of the rule as in California. The
court held that a commercial baseball stadium operator owes a duty that
is “symmetrical” to that of the spectator.203 Under New Mexico’s formulation of the rule, “[s]pectators must exercise ordinary care to protect themselves from the inherent risk of being hit by a projectile that leaves the
field of play and owner/occupant must exercise ordinary care not to increase that inherent risk.”204 In so holding, the court rejected the formulation of the baseball rule articulated in Akins.205 Therefore, in New
Mexico, the relevant inquiry is not whether the stadium operator provided protected seating. Rather, like Lowe,206 it is whether the risk leading to the plaintiff’s injury is associated with an inherent or necessary
aspect of the game.207
The court believed that modification of the duty between the stadium operator and spectators was necessary due to the “unique nature”
of the relationship between the parties and the “policy concerns implicated by this relationship.”208 The court stated that its approach also rec198. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 37, 241 P.3d at 1097 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 708).
199. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
200. See Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 36–38, 241 P.3d at 1096–97 (“With this
legal backdrop, a division of the California Court of Appeals modified the state’s
earliest baseball rule . . . .”).
201. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
202. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 42, 241 P.3d at 1098; Kabella v. Bouschelle,
100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
203. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1097.
204. Id. ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1097–98.
205. 424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981) (“[I]n the exercise of reasonable care, the
proprietor need only provide screening for the area of the field behind home plate
where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest.”).
206. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
207. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 38–39, 241 P.3d at 1097.
208. Id. ¶ 40, 241 P.3d at 1097.
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ognizes the “impossibility of playing . . . baseball without projectiles
leaving the field of play.”209 Likewise, the rule balances the interest of
fans who desire protected seating with those that attend baseball games
in hopes of catching a souvenir ball or having an unobstructed view of the
game.210 Implied in these policy justifications is the rationale that stadium
operators have a legitimate business interest in catering to the fans’
desires. Thus, the court stated that applying the traditional standard of
care owed by landowners to visitors would be “inapposite” in the context
of commercial baseball spectator injuries.211
The court was confident that the rule announced was both consistent with New Mexico’s system of pure comparative fault and justified by
significant public policy. While noting the rule is “rigid” even for injuries
arising from inherent risks of the game, the court stated that modified
versions of the baseball rule, such as that adopted by New Mexico, do not
prevent recovery for spectators injured by all projectiles entering the
stands.212 In “extraordinary circumstances,” cases involving such injuries
will still go before the jury to determine whether the stadium operator
acted to increase the risks to the spectator, or in some way impeded spectators’ ability to protect themselves.213 The court stated, however, that
“[a]s long as an owner/occupant “exercises ordinary care not to increase
the inherent risk[s] . . . he or she need not be concerned about adverse
social and economic impacts on the citizens of New Mexico.”214
The Edward C. court upheld denial of the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment because the defendants’ affidavits failed to establish
compliance with the rule articulated by the court. While the defendants’
affidavits showed compliance with the rule stated in Akins,215 they did not
establish that, as owners and occupiers of the stadium, they exercised ordinary care not to increase the inherent risk to the plaintiffs of projectiles
leaving the field of play.216 Presumably important to the court’s decision
was the fact that the child was not seated in an area “dedicated solely to
viewing the game” and that batting practice allegedly began without
warning.217 Thus, there were issues of material fact as to whether the de209. Id. ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1098.
210. Id.
211. Id. ¶ 40, 241 P.3d at 1097.
212. Id. ¶ 39, 241 P.3d at 1097.
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1098.
215. 424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981) (“[I]n the exercise of reasonable care, the
proprietor need only provide screening for the area of the field behind home plate
where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest.”).
216. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 43–44, 241 P.3d at 1098.
217. Id. ¶ 5, 241 P.3d at 1088.
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fendants exercised ordinary care to not increase the inherent risks of the
game to the plaintiffs.
IV. THE SYMMETRICAL DUTY IN NEW MEXICO:
PRESENT AND FUTURE
It is important to note that the Edward C. court did not technically
adopt a “no-duty” rule in this case. In fact, the City and the Isotopes
conceded the existence of a duty to the plaintiffs.218 Rather, the court articulated a specific, or modified, standard of care that stadium operators
owe to spectators. While the court defined the scope of the duty, the
court did not, however, necessarily limit a stadium operator’s liability for
spectator injuries beyond any limitation possible by the application of
comparative negligence principles. Part IV.A of the following analysis
will discuss the parameters and ambiguities present in the court’s articulation of the “symmetrical duty.” Part IV.B will discuss the future implications of the rule and the potential expansion of modified duties for
inherent risk activities in New Mexico.
A. Ambiguities Inherent in the Symmetrical Duty Formulation of the
Baseball Rule
While the court’s holding was correctly applied to the Edward C.
facts, the opinion itself offers little guidance for future baseball spectator
injury litigation occurring in New Mexico. Indeed, depending on the
court’s definition of “commercial,” the holding potentially only applies to
injuries occurring in Isotopes Park. Similarly unclear is the extent to
which the “symmetrical duty” aspect of the holding applies even within
the boundaries of the baseball park. In other words, not only is the holding limited by its commercial label, it also limited to circumstances in
which a fan is actually hit by a projectile leaving the field of play. Thus,
the modified duty is not triggered upon entrance into the stadium but
rather only when a fan is, in fact, struck by a projectile.219 Presumably
then, the standard landowner to visitor duty of ordinary care announced
in Ford v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Dona Ana220

218. See id. ¶¶ 9–10, 241 P.3d at 1089. Defendants did not ask the court to find no
duty, but for the imposition of a limited-duty. Id.
219. Projectiles are not limited to baseballs. See Benejam v. Detriot Tigers, Inc.,
635 N.W.2d. 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding in favor of baseball proprietors
where minor was struck by a fragment of a baseball bat).
220. 118 N.M. 134, 139, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (1994) (modifying UJI 13-309 to read,
“[a]n owner owes a visitor the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for
use by the visitor”). In practice, this means that the stadium operator duty to patrons
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still defines the duty owed by a stadium operator to its patrons, in which
the modified duty articulated in Edward C. plays only a small, if not situational, role.
In discussing the symmetrical duty dichotomy, it is first important to
break down the respective duties of the spectator and the stadium operator according to the rule announced by the court. First, “the spectators
must exercise ordinary care to protect themselves from the inherent risk
of being hit by a projectile that leaves the field of play . . . .”221 The opinion does not suggest that the use of “ordinary care” in this context departs from the universally applied standard. Therefore, under the
generalized definition of ordinary care, a fan’s exercise of ordinary care
“is that care which a reasonably prudent person would use in the conduct
of the person’s own affairs.”222 As “ordinary care varies with the nature of
what is being done,”223 a spectator’s exercise of ordinary care could be
articulated as the “reasonably prudent spectator” standard. In practice,
this duty of self-protection would certainly include being aware of the
game while in play, taking adequate measures to protect oneself should a
foul ball enter the stands, and possibly even the exercise of caution
should the spectator decide to actively try to catch a foul ball. Regardless,
this aspect of the symmetrical duty imparts knowledge to all patrons of a
baseball game that inherent risks exist as part of the spectator experience.
The main question raised by the spectator prong of the symmetrical
duty, however, is to what it extent its inclusion in the court’s holding has
any discernable purpose. It is an accepted principle that “[a] plaintiff who
engages in an [inherent risk] activity . . . is subject to the defense
of . . . comparative fault.”224 It is unclear, though, how the spectator prong
of the symmetrical duty increases the duty upon an injured spectator
above what that spectator would be subject to based on a defense of comparative fault. As a general principle, “comparative negligence denies re-

arising from injuries other than projectiles leaving the field of play is left unmodified.
Therefore “slip and fall,” and a host of other potential injuries, are governed by UJI
13-309. Similarly, injuries arising from other “projectiles” would also be analyzed
under the non-modified standard of care. See Dog Daze: Kansas City Royals Fan Sues
after Weiner Hits Him, ESPN (Feb. 23, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/
story?id=4939680 (discussing lawsuit brought by fan injured when Royal’s mascot
threw a hot dog, striking the fan in the eye).
221. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1097–98.
222. UJI 13-1603 NMRA.
223. UJI 13-1603 NMRA.
224. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2002-NMCA-060, ¶ 21, 48 P.3d 70, 77.
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covery for one’s own fault.”225 Therefore, regardless of including a
spectator duty of self-protection in the rule, a stadium operator defendant
would likely argue that the injured spectator was not paying attention or
in some way contributed to the injury as a means of limiting the defendant’s liability. Further, despite the court rejecting a “sufficient protected
netting”226 analysis for baseball spectator injuries, it is unclear why a spectator’s failure to choose a protected seat is insufficient to breach the spectator’s duty of self-protection. In other words, if a spectator is aware that
fly balls routinely enter the stands and that the stadium provides protected seating, the spectator’s failure to occupy one of these seats is a
seemingly unreasonable exercise of the spectator’s duty. This result,
which would essentially bring a “sufficient protected netting” analysis in
through the back door, would of course be anomalous with the court’s
rejection of the Akins holding. Yet, this scenario highlights the ambiguity
present in the spectator duty of self-protection.
Ultimately, the spectator prong of the symmetrical duty comes
down to the three dirty words in comparative fault jurisprudence that the
court declined to explicitly state: assumption of risk. Any determination
of a spectator’s reasonable exercise of self-protection will necessarily entail an examination of what risks spectators knowingly subject themselves
to in attending baseball games. As such, it is nothing more than a determination of a plaintiff’s “voluntary exposure to a known danger.”227 This
concept is routinely characterized as “secondary assumption of risk” because it is a determination of the plaintiff’s negligence in knowingly and
voluntarily confronting the danger.228 While New Mexico courts have preserved primary assumption of risk,229 secondary assumption of risk, as an
analysis of a plaintiff’s own negligence, is now considered incorporated
within the normal weighing of fault under comparative negligence principles.230 Thus, the spectator’s duty of self-protection, as a variant of secon-

225. Scott v. Rizzo, 96, N.M. 682, 690, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1981), superseded by
statute, NMSA 1978, 41-3A-1 (1987), as recognized in Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628,
875 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1992).
226. See Akins v. Glen Falls School District, 424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981) (“[I]n
the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor need only provide screening for the
area of the field behind home plate where the danger of being struck by a ball is the
greatest.”).
227. Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 492, 734 P.2d 267, 272 (Ct.
App. 1987) (quoting Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 341, 491 P.2d 1147, 1152
(1971)).
228. See Thompson, 105 N.M. at 492, 734 P.2d at 272.
229. Id.
230. See id. (“The ‘knowing and voluntary confrontation with full appreciation of
the danger’ that is at issue here is secondary assumption of the risk, i.e., negligence on
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dary assumption risk, is seemingly obsolete when considered alongside
New Mexico comparative negligence jurisprudence; despite the court’s
apparent rooting of secondary assumption of risk in the trial court’s duty
determination, rather than a jury’s determination of breach.
Further, primary assumption of risk—a finding that the defendant
either owed no duty or did not breach a duty as a matter of law231—also
lurks within the court’s holding. If the plaintiff is struck by a projectile
while seated in an unprotect area and is unable to make a factual showing
that the defendant negligently increased an inherent risk, then the defendant cannot be said to have breached the stadium operator duty owed to
spectators. Importantly, even in this scenario the focus is still on stadium
operator’s conduct, not actions taken by a plaintiff in self-protection. Potentially, then, the most significant contribution of the spectator’s duty of
self-protection is its inclusion in the modified baseball rule at all; as without it, there would be no such thing as the novel concept of a “symmetrical duty.”
The duty of a stadium operator of a commercial baseball stadium,
on the other hand, is admittedly more complex. The duty of the stadium
operator to not increase the inherent risks is implicated in two situations.
The first situation is when the stadium operator has done “something to
increase the risks beyond those necessary or inherent to the game.”232
Second, the duty is implicated when the stadium operator has impeded
the “fan’s ability to protect himself or herself.”233 These two situations are
not mutually exclusive given that a stadium operator could both act to
increase an inherent risk of the game while impeding the fans’ ability to
protect themselves. Before determining, however, whether an stadium
operator has acted to increase an inherent risk, or impeded a spectator’s
duty of self-protection, it is important to determine what actually constitutes an inherent risk.
Cases favorably cited by the Edward C. court shed light on this potentially elusive standard. In Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, Inc.234
inherent risks were the “reasonable risks and hazards” of the game and
not risks outside the mutual expectations of the parties.235 Clearly within
the Brown court’s conception of a reasonable risk was that of being

the plaintiff’s part, which the court below properly compared to defendant’s
negligence . . . .”).
231. Id. at 491, 734 P.2d at 271.
232. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 39, 241 P.3d 1086,
1097.
233. Id.
234. 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
235. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 36, 241 P.3d at 1097.
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struck by a batted or thrown ball.236 Jones v. Three Rivers Management
Corp.237 defined inherent risks as those risks “common, frequent, and expected” in the activity.238 Perhaps most restrictively, Lowe v. California
League of Professional Baseball239 stated its formulation of inherent risks
as “some feature or aspect of the game which is inevitable or unavoidable
in the actual playing of the game.”240 It is important to remember, however, that under these standards, the relevant inquiry concerns the risk
that gave rise to the injury, not whether the plaintiff was injured by an
inherent risk, i.e., a foul ball.
The specific factual scenarios of the above cases similarly provide
insight into the court’s meaning of inherent risks. As previously stated,
courts applying an inherent risk analysis have allowed cases to proceed
where the plaintiff was struck by an errant pitch from the bullpen,241 when
standing in a concourse,242 and when struck after being distracted by a
mascot.243 In an additional case cited by the court, application of the baseball rule was limited to areas “dedicated solely to viewing the game.”244
The reason given for this limitation was that fans in multipurpose areas
“understandably let down their guard when they are in other areas of the
stadium.”245 When viewed collectively, these cases present a picture of
inherent risks as a relatively limited set of fact patterns. Far from requiring the “extraordinary circumstances” mentioned by the Edward C.
court,246 it is plausible that injured spectators need only show that prior to
being struck, their attention was diverted from the game by some feature
of the ballpark that impaired their ability to protect themselves. In an era
of increased marketing techniques and other general distractions meant
236. Brown, 222 P.2d at 21 (“[R]espondent fully discharged its duty toward appellant, as concerns the risk to her of being hit by thrown or batted baseballs, when it
provided screened seats for all who might reasonably be expected to request them, in
fact many more screened seats than were requested.”).
237. 394 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978).
238. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 34, 241 P.3d at 1096 (internal quotations
omitted).
239. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
240. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 38, 241 P.3d at 1097 (quoting Lowe, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 111).
241. Maytnier v. Rush, 225 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
242. Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 548 (Pa. 1978).
243. Lowe, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
244. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 28, 241 P.3d at 1094 (citing Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 881 A.2d 700, 708 (N.J. 2005), superseded by
statute, New Jersey Baseball Safety Act of 2006, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-43 to 48
(2005), as recognized in Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 944 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. 2008)).
245. Maisonave, 881 A.2d at 708.
246. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 39, 241 P.3d at 1097.
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to provide a lively environment for all ages, it is plausible that without
further elaboration on the meaning of inherent risk, the term itself will
prove to be of little use in limiting liability for stadium operators.
As a result, the burden on the plaintiff is relatively low in establishing whether a stadium operater has “done something”247 to either increase the inherent risks, or impede a fan’s ability to protect himself or
herself. The plaintiff’s burden is relatively low for a number of reasons.
First, the modified duty would likely only apply to bar a suit when the fan
is actually located in the stands or an area “dedicated solely to viewing
the game.”248 Second, the plaintiff need only allege that the risk giving
rise to the injury—not the projectile itself—was not an inherent risk of
the game. This could include such generalized distractions as in-game entertainment, other than the game itself, or a design in the seating area
that impedes the fan’s ability to be aware of projectiles, such as picnic
tables that face away from the field. Lastly, the plaintiff must allege that it
was the stadium operator’s actions or omissions that caused the risk. This
low barrier should assuage the fears of those worried that adoption of any
form of the baseball rule would prevent injured spectators from getting
their case before a jury. Rather, with such fertile ground for issues of
material fact, it is plausible that the modified duty articulated by the court
does little to insulate stadium operators of commercial baseball stadiums
from liability. Likewise, unfortunately for both stadium operators and
fans, the rule fails to articulate “clearer rules of behavior” that would
allow them to take affirmative steps to limit injuries or potential
lawsuits.249
B. The Baseball Rule in New Mexico Moving Forward
Though the modified duty announced by the court has often been
referred to as the “baseball rule,” in New Mexico it may be properly
termed the Isotopes Rule. The court’s holding was limited to the context
of commercial baseball.250 Currently, New Mexico has only one commer247. Id.
248. See id. ¶ 5, 241 P.3d at 1088 (“[I]t is alleged that the injured child was not in an
area dedicated solely to viewing the game . . . . Given the scope of duty that we define today and Plaintiff’s allegations, we conclude that . . . Defendants did not make a
prima facie showing entitling them to summary judgment.”).
249. See id. ¶ 21, 241 P.3d at 1092 (noting that one benefit of modifying a duty of
care is in “providing clearer rules of behavior for actions who may be subject to tort
liability and who structure their behavior in response to that potential liability” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM, § 7 cmt. i (2010)).
250. Id. ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1097 (stating that “[w]e hold, therefore, that an owner/
occup[ier] of a commercial baseball stadium . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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cial baseball team, the Albuquerque Isotopes. Therefore, barring expansion of commercial baseball in New Mexico, it is likely the court’s holding
is only applicable to injuries occurring in Isotopes Park. However, the
articulation of the duty, and the policy and rationale used to justify it,
may provide for expansion in other areas of New Mexico law.
The most obvious extension of the rule would be to non-commercialized baseball. Whether it be Little League, high school, or even collegiate-level baseball, it would seem that the similar inherent risks of
attending these activities would impose a duty of self-protection upon
spectators. The issue, however, is that the policy justifications supporting
the rule do not easily extend to these venues.251 For instance, most spectators attending a Little League or high school baseball game are likely
attending due to some relationship to a player or the team. Most spectators are not there to catch foul balls and the stadium operators of the
park, be it a school district or Little League association, have no business
interest in encouraging spectators to do so. Perhaps different, but just as
substantial, policy reasons would justify a modified duty for these venues.
These policy justifications could range from an acknowledgment of the
often limited financial resources of these stadium operators to the social
benefits of encouraging youth sports. In fact, despite the presumption
that the standard duty of ordinary care still applies to non-commercialized baseball stadiums, it is possible that these policy justifications would
warrant a more limited form of the baseball rule than that announced in
Edward C.
A second area of expansion could be similar modified duties for stadium operators of other commercialized sports in New Mexico. Apart
from the Isotopes, New Mexico currently also has a minor-league basketball team, the Albuquerque Thunderbirds, and a professional junior
league hockey team, the New Mexico Mustangs. Formerly, New Mexico
also had a minor-league hockey team, the New Mexico Scorpions, which
ceased operations in 2009. In McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters, the
New Mexico Supreme Court rejected limiting or modifying the duty of
care owed to basketball game spectators.252 The impact of Edward C. on
McFatridge remains to be seen. Basketball, however, seems an unlikely
area of expansion of Edward C. due both to the McFatridge holding and
the differing expected spectator experiences between basketball and

251. See id. ¶ 41, 241 P.2d at 1098 (“[The rule] balances the practical interest of
watching a sport that encourages players to strike a ball beyond the field of play in
fair ball territory to score runs with the safety and entertainment interests of the spectators in catching such balls.”).
252. 69 N.M. 271, 276–77, 365 P.2d 918, 921–22 (1961).
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baseball.253 Hockey is also a potential candidate for a similar modified
duty in the context of a traditional commercial sporting event. Similar to
baseball, the inherent risk of being injured by a projectile does exist at
hockey games and many hockey arenas do provide netting behind the
goals to protect fans. Indeed, in some cases the modified or limited duties
for baseball stadium proprietors has been referenced in extending a similar rule to hockey spectator injuries.254 Thus, it would be logical to extend
the Edward C. holding to hockey, should such a case come before a New
Mexico appellate court.
A potentially interesting area of expansion exists in the overlap between the court’s holding in Edward C. and in Kabella v. Bouschelle.255 In
Edward C., the court stated that “it is consistent with New Mexico case
law to modify the duty owed in the context of participatory sporting
events when a risk of physical injury is inherent to the activity.”256 The
Edward C. court cited Kabella as support for this proposition.257 Yet, the
duty modified in Edward C., unlike Kabella, is not directed towards those
participating in the sporting event, rather it is directed towards spectators.258 Likewise, the Kabella holding applies regardless of whether the
game being played is an organized game or an informal undertaking, e.g.,
tag football, unlike Edward C.’s commercial limitation.259 The most significant difference between the cases, however, is the different duty standards. In Kabella a suit must be based on intentional or reckless
conduct,260 while Edward C. requires that a defendant not have increased
inherent risks of the game.261 Nevertheless, the potential for overlap exists
in sports or recreational activities where the line between spectator and
participant may be blurry. This issue could arise in municipally owned
skateboard parks, for instance, or collegiate intramural activities. Used
together, then, the two holdings could lead to an expansion of modified
duties into a host of both formal sporting events and recreational activities insulating otherwise potential defendants from liability to both participants and spectators.

253. See id. at 276–77, 365 P.2d at 922 (stating that there is no “real danger of
injury to spectators at a basketball game from balls entering the spectator section in
the usual and ordinary course of a game”).
254. See Sciarrotta v. Global Spectrum, 944 A.2d 630 (N.J. 2008).
255. 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
256. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 42, 241 P.3d at 1098.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Kabella, 100 N.M. at 464, 672 P.2d at 293.
261. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1097–98.
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Taken jointly, the Edward C. and Kabella decisions evidence that, at
least in the context of sports, not all movements in New Mexico are away
from “judicially declared . . . protectionism.”262 By incorporating the symmetrical duty concept of Edward C., future sport or high-risk activities
may see a rise in duty modifications that include a duty of self-protection
for participants and spectators for inherent risks. Any modification will
still require significant public policy justifications but both cases provide
the needed foundation for these arguments.
CONCLUSION
Time will tell whether the rule announced by the court has any significance past the gates of Isotopes Park. On the one hand, the case represents a unique judicial response to a potentially recurring, yet limited,
factual scenario. On the other, it signals another case in which New Mexico has modified a duty in response to the public, and even private, interests at stake in the litigation. In this vein, it could be a signpost evidencing
a shift in New Mexico’s negligence jurisprudence indicating a greater burden on potential plaintiffs to protect themselves against the inherent risks
of activities while limiting liability for facilitators of those activities. Regardless, the rule announced by the court reinforces the viability of the
baseball rule in American jurisprudence while simultaneously adding a
unique, if not novel, twist to its continued evolution.

262. Yount v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-046, ¶ 4, 915 P.2d 341, 342.

